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INTRODUCTION
Which candidate’s name should be listed first on a ballot?1 Should
inactive voters’ names appear printed in polling place books?2 Should
elections be conducted exclusively by mail?3 Should online voter
registration be available to prospective voters?4 When voters sign a petition
to help a candidate appear on the ballot, must the petition’s circulator reside
in the state?5
These are the questions that ordinary election administration rules answer.
There might be better or worse rules. These rules might advance one set of
benefits in exchange for another set of costs. They could benefit one
* Professor of Law, Bouma Fellow in Law, University of Iowa College of Law. This Article

was prepared for the Symposium entitled Toward Our 60th Presidential Election, hosted by
the Fordham Law Review on February 26, 2021, at Fordham University School of Law. I
thank the Fordham Law Review and Jerry Goldfeder for a terrific symposium. This paper
benefited from feedback from Travis Crum, Rebecca Green, Lisa Marshall Manheim, Michael
Morley, Rick Pildes, and Abby Wood, among others. Special thanks to Kevin Kim for his
excellent research.
1. See, e.g., Nelson v. Warner, 446 F. Supp. 3d 119 (S.D. W. Va. 2020); Jacobson v. Lee,
411 F. Supp. 3d 1249 (N.D. Fla. 2019), vacated sub nom. Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974
F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2020).
2. See, e.g., Common Cause/New York v. Brehm, No. 17-CV-6770, 2020 WL 122589
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2020).
3. See, e.g., Paher v. Cegavske, 457 F. Supp. 3d 919 (D. Nev. 2020).
4. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 447 F. Supp. 3d 757 (W.D. Wis.
2020).
5. See, e.g., Benezet Consulting v. Boockvar, 433 F. Supp. 3d 670 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
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candidate or group over another. Like every rule, they could alter behavior
in ways that affect who participates in elections or which candidate wins.
But they have another thing in common: plaintiffs have litigated each
dispute. Judges have increasingly evaluated ever-finer points of election
administration. This Article posits why the judiciary has done so and offers
potential ways to reduce election litigation.
Part I examines the rise in litigation and attributes at least some of that
increase to several causes: increased campaign expenditures on litigation;
increased partisanship in state legislatures, yielding more contentious
election laws; the decline of preclearance under the Voting Rights Act of
19656 after Shelby County v. Holder;7 and U.S. Supreme Court extensions of
the Anderson v. Celebrezze8 framework to broad areas of election law.
Undoubtedly, one factor that made 2020 an especially litigious election
was the arrival and spread of the novel coronavirus, which precipitated
extensive actions (or attempted actions) to alter9 or postpone10 previously
scheduled elections. But this Article sees a challenge: cash-laden litigants
pressing judges to provide a preferred set of election practices, seizing on
inconsistencies within the states’ election codes or an absence of federal
oversight to do so.
Part II suggests that less litigation is desirable. While acknowledging that
litigation can advance important interests, this part argues that it can also
undermine confidence in elections or add needless complexity to election law
around election time. To reduce litigation, jurisdictions could increase
uniformity in legislation by “leveling up” decisions, which reduces friction
in decision-making and incentives to litigate, while increasing consistency
both in terms of voter treatment and in terms of judicial precedent.
Additionally, federal campaign finance law currently privileges donations
earmarked for litigation. This gives campaigns incentives to focus on
litigation-centric fundraising. Eliminating these incentives would place
money raised for litigation on equal footing with money raised for other

6. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52
U.S.C.).
7. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
8. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
9. Consider one list of tracked changes from Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Quinn Scanlan,
Here’s How States Have Changed the Rules Voting amid the Coronavirus Pandemic, ABC
NEWS (Sep. 22, 2020, 6:57 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/states-changed-rules-votingamid-coronavirus-pandemic/story?id=72309089 [https://perma.cc/ZH6U-F7QV].
10. Consider changes in Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Nick Corasaniti & Stephanie Saul, 16 States Have
Postponed Primaries During the Pandemic. Here’s a List., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/2020-campaign-primary-calendar-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/LUS5-LL5C].
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purposes and compel campaigns to reconsider their resource-allocation
strategies.
I. THE GROWTH IN ELECTION LITIGATION
Election litigation has grown dramatically in recent years. Professor
Richard Hasen has written about the increased trend in litigation between
2000, when Bush v. Gore was decided, and 2006.11 The statistics presented
by Professor Hasen pale in comparison to the data from 2020.
Early evidence from 2020 points to two types of election litigation. First,
over 300 lawsuits citing the COVID-19 pandemic as a basis for judicial
intervention were filed in 2020.12 Second, President Donald Trump and
supporting parties filed over sixty lawsuits in postelection lawsuits
concerning matters ranging from election observers’ presence during ballot
counting13 to the vice president’s role in the counting of electoral votes.14
But the trend in increased litigation began well before 2020—the events of
that year simply accelerated it.
A. New Litigation Expenditure Opportunities
In 2014, the combination of a Supreme Court decision and a federal statute
yielded a new and powerful earmark for election litigation. Major parties’
litigation expenditures have dramatically increased ever since.
When Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197115 and
amended it in 1974,16 it limited the amount of money that individuals could
contribute to candidates for federal office.17 The act prohibited individuals
from contributing more than $1000 to any candidate’s election campaign.18
It also prohibited donors from contributing a total of more than $25,000 to
federal candidates in a given year.19
These limits survived a constitutional challenge in 1976, when the
Supreme Court decided Buckley v. Valeo.20 The Court first worried that
“contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if
the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing

11. Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28–29
(2007).
12. COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker, STANFORD-MIT HEALTHY ELECTIONS
PROJECT (Mar. 24, 2021, 8:15 PM), https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/
[https://perma.cc/RPT9-F52W].
13. See, e.g., In re Canvassing Observation, 241 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2020).
14. See Gohmert v. Pence, 510 F. Supp. 3d 435 (E.D. Tex. 2020), aff’d, 832 F. App’x 349
(5th Cir. 2021).
15. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 47,
and 52 U.S.C.).
16. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
17. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12–14 (1976) (per curiam).
18. Id. at 13.
19. Id.
20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”21 But it went on, “[t]here is
no indication . . . that the contribution limitations imposed by the Act would
have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political
associations.”22 The Court concluded that the burden on contributors was a
“marginal restriction”:23
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate
and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the
support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not
increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression
rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. 24

The Court extensively considered the $1000 contribution limitation in
upholding it.25 The Court’s consideration of the $25,000 aggregate limitation
was cursory, but that restriction also passed constitutional scrutiny.26
Pursuant to campaign finance law amendments since Buckley, the
inflation-adjusted contribution limit increased to $2600 for individual
candidates by 2013.27 The biennial aggregate limitation rose to $123,200—
$48,600 in contributions to candidates and $74,600 in contributions to other
committees.28 Political donors, in other words, could contribute to the
maximum limits set for individual candidates but also faced an overall
maximum limit in a two-year period.29
The Supreme Court considered a challenge to the aggregate limitations in
2014 in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission.30 Among other
things, Shaun McCutcheon sought to contribute $1776 to twelve candidates
running for federal office, below the $2600 contribution limit for each of
them.31 He had already given $33,088 to sixteen other candidates, so the
$1776 contributions would put him over the aggregate limit.32 He also had
a similar desire to contribute to national party committees within the
individual limits but beyond the aggregate limits.33 The Supreme Court
found that the aggregate contribution limit violated the First Amendment.34
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id. at 21.
25. Id. at 23–35.
26. Id. at 38; see McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 198 (2014)
(plurality opinion) (per curiam) (noting that the Buckley Court considered the aggregate limit
“in one paragraph of its 139-page opinion”).
27. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A), modified by Price Index Adjustments for Contribution
and Expenditure Limitations, 78 Fed. Reg. 8530 (Feb. 6, 2013). The $2600 limit applies to
each election separately, so a donor may in fact give $5200 over the course of an election
cycle—$2600 for the primary election and $2600 for the general election.
28. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(3), modified by Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and
Expenditure Limitations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 8532.
29. Id.
30. 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 194.
32. Id. at 194–95.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 227.
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The Court’s reasoning turned, in part, on the fact that the base limits would
remain “undisturbed” as “the primary means of regulating campaign
contributions,”35 reflecting the Buckley Court’s overwhelming focus on
defending the base limits. As the Court saw the problem, “[i]f there is no
corruption concern in giving nine candidates up to $5,200 each, it is difficult
to understand how a tenth candidate can be regarded as corruptible if given
$1,801, and all others corruptible if given a dime.”36
Political donors may now contribute as much money to campaigns as they
see fit, as long as they meet individual contribution limits. Immediately after
McCutcheon, however, Congress used the case’s holding to expand
opportunities to raise larger sums of money earmarked for election litigation.
In December 2014, Congress passed the Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015,37 or the “Cromnibus,” an omnibus
spending bill, which, among other things, increased certain contribution
limits in federal elections.38 In the 2019–2020 election cycle,39 a donor could
give a national party committee $106,500 for litigation expenses “to defray
expenses incurred with respect to the preparation for and the conduct of
election recounts and contests and other legal proceedings.”40 That means
that while donors are capped at contributing $5600 to a presidential
candidate’s primary and general election fund, they can contribute $106,500
to the party’s lawyers for litigation expenses. In other words, a donor can
give nearly twenty times as much to a presidential candidate’s lawyers as it
can to the presidential candidate.41
Between 2003 and 2015, political parties’ legal expenditures—measured
by examining the Democratic and Republican national committees and their
congressional and senate entities42—hovered around $5 million per year.43
35. Id. at 209.
36. Id. at 210.
37. Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
38. President Obama expressly opposed this provision but signed the law anyway. See
160 CONG. REC. H9285 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2014) (“[T]he Administration is opposed to
inclusion of a rider that would amend the Federal Election Campaign Act to allow individual
donors to contribute to national political party committee accounts for conventions, buildings
and recounts in amounts that are dramatically higher than what the law currently permits.”).
Representative John Boehner and Senator Harry Reid defended the provision by explaining
that such contributions are subject to “hard money” limits and disclosure requirements, and
that they “are not for the purpose of influencing federal elections.” Id. at H9286; see also 160
CONG. REC. S6814 (Dec. 13, 2014).
39. Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations, 84 Fed. Reg.
2504, 2506 (Feb. 7, 2019).
40. Pub. L. No. 113-235, div. N, § 101, 128 Stat. 2132, 2773 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 30116(a)(9)). See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FEC
INFLATION-ADJUSTMENT MEMO FOR 2019-2020 (2019).
41. Special thanks to Professor Abby Wood for her thoughts in approaching this topic.
42. The six entities are the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the
Democratic National Committee (DNC), the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
(DSCC), the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), the National
Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), and the Republican National Committee (RNC).
43. See Appendix A.
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That figure dipped to just below $3 million in 2008 but surpassed $7.5
million in 2012, but it remained fairly steady between 2003 and 2015.
In 2016, however, legal expenses shot up to over $15 million in
expenditures, more than double the 2012 total.44 In 2017, the total dipped to
just under $10 million. In 2018, it rose again to nearly $24 million, went up
again in 2019 to $28 million, and surpassed an astonishing $66 million in
2020.45
Peaks in presidential election years or off-cycle election years are intuitive.
The bulk of redistricting occurred in 2011 and 2012, when one might
otherwise expect increases in party spending on litigation. But the significant
increases from 2015 onward are noteworthy.
One might attribute this trend to particular partisan factors, but the overall
rise is emphatically bipartisan. Republican Party expenditures may in part
be attributable to costs associated with President Trump’s legal defense team
during his four years in office. On the Democratic side, heightened legal
spending may be due to an increase in initiated litigation or intervention in
litigation.
Such expenditures remain a very small part of party entities’ total costs,
but the percentage of parties’ overall spending devoted to legal costs
continues to rise. Total legal expenditures in the 2010 cycle were around 1
percent of all expenditures from these six party entities and 0.8 percent in the
2012 cycle.46 In 2020, they were 3.7 percent of all expenditures.47
There is one additional caveat, and it is a significant one. It is possible that
there has also been an increase in third-party or nonprofit funding for
election-related litigation. While entities like the ACLU or the NAACP have
long engaged in impact litigation relating to elections, it is unclear how much
their efforts have changed in recent years. Future research might explore
whether these entities have proportionately increased their election-related
litigation alongside the major parties.48
When the parties control lawsuits funded by campaign contributions, they
can begin to veer toward “campaigning by litigation,”49 where the suit
becomes a rallying cry for one’s partisans. Even a weak case can mobilize
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Matthew Boyle, Exclusive—GOP Stands Up “Permanent” “Election
Integrity Operations” Nationwide to “Kill” Democrat Takeover Attempts “in Their Infancy,”
BREITBART (Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/08/11/exclusive-gopstands-up-permanent-election-integrity-operations-nationwide-kill-democrat-takeoverattempts-their-infancy/ [https://perma.cc/Q8T5-3KRN] (examining records of the Republican
National Committee that identified “more than $30 million” spent in 2020 on litigation).
46. Cf.
Democratic
Congressional
Campaign
Comm.,
OPEN SECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/parties/totals.php?cmte=DCCC&cycle=2010
[https://perma.cc/YB4P-79DD] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); Democratic Congressional
Campaign
Comm.,
OPEN
SECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/parties/
totals.php?cmte=DCCC&cycle=2012 [https://perma.cc/ER6U-H6G7] (last visited Sept. 17,
2021).
47. Id.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 132–35 (asking whether reductions in party
expenditures would correlate with reduction in litigation or simply hamstring party control).
49. All credit to Lisa Manheim for inspiring this term.
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donors, as the filing of a complaint receives significant media attention and
can be a basis to request further contributions. Incentives flourish with funds
earmarked for election litigation.
B. Partisanship
Increased partisanship in state government may be contributing to recent
litigation over election laws. State government “trifectas”—where a single
party holds control of the state house, the state senate, and the
governorship—have risen in recent years. Thirty-six states had trifectas in
2020, up from twenty-five in 2010.50 If one party is in charge of legislation,
including election law legislation, it seems reasonable that the party out of
power will be more likely to challenge election laws through litigation,
particularly if that party believes the new laws harm its interests. The flip
side of one-party rule is intractability, which can also lead to litigation if the
legislative and executive branches cannot resolve disputes.
Partisanship certainly prompted the disputes in Wisconsin ahead of the
2020 primary and general elections. Consider a brief narrative.
On March 13, 2020, ahead of the April 7 primary, the Democratic National
Committee and the Democratic Party of Wisconsin petitioned a federal court
asking to extend the deadline for voter registration to prevent enforcement of
proof of residency or photo identification requirements “until the COVID-19
crisis is over” and to extend the deadline for ballots to be received after
Election Day.51 On March 20, the court extended the registration deadline
from March 18 to March 30.52
On April 2, the court extended the absentee ballot request deadline from
April 2 to April 3.53 It also extended the deadline for receiving absentee
ballots from 8:00 PM on April 7 to 4:00 PM on April 13.54 The next day, a
panel of the Seventh Circuit denied the motion for a stay and allowed these
deadlines to remain in place.55
That same day, April 3, Governor Tony Evers signed an executive order
calling the legislature into a special session. Governor Evers sought to have
the legislature convene on April 4 to extend the election date to May 19 and

50. 2020
State
Elections
Coverage,
MULTISTATE
(Dec.
1,
2020),
https://www.multistate.us/pages/2020-state-elections-coverage
[https://perma.cc/G9ERDVCT].
51. Complaint at 15, Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952 (W.D.
Wis. 2020) (No. 20-cv-249), rev’d, Nos. 20-1538, 20-1539, 20-1546, 20-1545, 2020 WL
3619499 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020).
52. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 447 F. Supp. 3d 757, 700 (W.D. Wis. 2020),
rev’d, No. 20-1538, 2020 WL 3619499 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2020).
53. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 977.
54. Id. at 983. Another order about witness certifications was enjoined by the Seventh
Circuit on appeal. See Bostelmann, 2020 WL 3619499, at *2.
55. Bostelmann, 2020 WL 3619499, at *1.
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provide other accommodations.56 The legislature met on April 4 but
adjourned without taking action.57
On the litigation front, the Republican National Committee, as an
intervenor, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court with one narrow issue. It did
not appeal the absentee ballot request deadline (which had already passed),
and it did not appeal the six-day extension of the deadline for absentee ballots
to be received, as long as they were mailed by April 7 (election day).
The governor issued another order on April 6, again calling the legislature
into a special session and asking it to enact voting-related laws.58 The order
also attempted to “suspend in-person voting for April 7, 2020, until June 9,
2020, unless the Legislature passes and the Governor approves a different
date for in-person voting”59—days after the governor claimed he lacked the
power to do so.60 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a 4–2 decision, stayed
that portion of the order.61 The legislature met on April 7 and again did not
act.62
The 2020 Wisconsin presidential primary (which included other state
elections on the ballot, too) had remarkably high turnout,63 and retrospectives
showed that in-person voting would be relatively safe.64 But by the fall, the
Wisconsin legislature and the governor remained unable (or unwilling) to
resolve their differences. On September 21, a federal district court decided
four consolidated cases, issuing an injunction to extend voter registration by
a week, allowing late-arriving absentee ballots to be counted if postmarked
56. Governor Tony Evers, Wis. Exec. Order No. 73 (Apr. 4, 2020), https://evers.wi.gov/
Documents/COVID19/EO073-SpecialSessionElections%20searchable.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4QZ-83UF].
57. April 2020 Special Session, STATE OF WISCONSIN ASSEMBLY J. (Apr. 4, 2020,
4:09 PM), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2019/related/journals/assembly/20200404ap0
[https://perma.cc/T2M8-A9VM]; April 2020 Special Session, STATE OF WISCONSIN
ASSEMBLY J.
(Apr.
4, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/
2019/related/journals/senate/20200404ap0 [https://perma.cc/2UA4-CKVC].
58. Wis. Exec. Order No. 74 (Apr. 7, 2020), https://evers.wi.gov/
Documents/COVID19/EO074-SuspendingInPersonVotingAndSpecialSession2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7L4-8DJX].
59. Id.
60. See Natasha Korecki & Zach Montellaro, Wisconsin Supreme Court Overturns
Governor, Orders Tuesday Elections to Proceed, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2020, 7:59 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/06/wisconsin-governor-orders-stop-to-in-personvoting-on-eve-of-election-168527 [https://perma.cc/N592-7QS4].
61. Wis. Legislature v. Evers, No. 2020AP608-OA (Wis. Apr. 6, 2020).
62. April 2020 Special Session II, STATE OF WISCONSIN ASSEMBLY J. (Apr. 7, 2020,
2:02 PM), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2019/related/journals/assembly/202004072ap0
[https://perma.cc/6SGM-Z996]; April 2020 Special Session II, STATE OF WISCONSIN
ASSEMBLY J. (Apr. 7, 2020 2:00 PM), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2019/related/journals/
senate/202004072ap0 [https://perma.cc/4YZB-XBCW].
63. Richard H. Pildes & Charles Stewart III, The Wisconsin Primary Had Extraordinarily
High Voter Turnout, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2020/04/15/wisconsin-primary-had-extraordinarily-high-voter-turnout/
[https://perma.cc/E3MK-NNX5].
64. Russell Berman, If You Can Grocery Shop in Person, You Can Vote in Person,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/votingduring-pandemic-pretty-safe/616084/ [https://perma.cc/JN7N-959C].
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by Election Day and received within six days and permitting replacement
absentee ballots to be provided online.65 The court did not, however, enjoin
the enforcement of the requirement that absentee voters obtain witness
signatures, and it did not ease a photo identification requirement for absentee
ballot requests.66
The Seventh Circuit, after briefly referring the case to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to determine whether the state legislature could pursue an
appeal, stayed the injunction on October 8.67 Its principal basis was that the
district court had issued its order too late; federal courts, the Supreme Court
has held, ought not alter election laws on the eve of an election.68 In an
October 26 decision, the Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay, allowing
Wisconsin’s original rules to remain in place. This order was part of a series
of Supreme Court opinions weighing in on the matter of the ballot receipt
deadline.69
Sclerotic legislatures assuredly heightened litigant interest and judicial
suspicion.70 But an additional litigation peril is the consent decree, in which
the executive might attempt to undermine a legislative scheme by negotiating
a judicially enforceable settlement with the plaintiff.71 For example,
Michigan’s secretary of state, a Democrat, attempted to negotiate a consent
decree shortly after taking office to resolve a lawsuit contending that the
state’s legislative districts were the product of a Republican gerrymander.
The deal would have required a new map, a move opposed by the
Republican-controlled legislature, and was blocked only after a federal court
rejected it.72
In 2020, a consent decree in North Carolina was the source of extensive
litigation. Unlike the stagnant Wisconsin legislature, the North Carolina
legislature made a series of changes to its election statutes in light of the
pandemic.73 The North Carolina State Board of Elections (“the Board”)
65. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 787–88 (W.D. Wis.
2020).
66. Id. at 805–06. It also concluded that the failure of the Wisconsin Elections
Commission to “take adequate action” to reduce “intimidation” of voting during a pandemic
was not a violation of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 816.
67. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2020).
68. Id. at 641 (citing Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S. 929 (2014)); id. at 642 (citing Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006)).
69. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.);
id. at 28 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay); id. (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in denial of application to vacate stay); id. at 30 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
denial of application to vacate stay); id. at 40 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
70. See, e.g., id. at 43 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Wisconsin legislature had
failed to enact legislation pertaining to election administration during the COVID-19
pandemic).
71. See generally ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROAD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2004); Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold
Elections?: Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI.
L.F. 295.
72. For details about the attempted consent decree, see Derek T. Muller, Nonjudicial
Solutions to Partisan Gerrymandering, 62 HOW. L.J. 791, 807–08 (2019).
73. 2020 N.C. Sess. Laws 104–11.
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entered into a consent decree in another lawsuit, altering, among other things,
the absentee ballot receipt deadline.74 On October 14, 2020, a federal district
court concluded that the Board appeared to have exceeded its authority in
some components of its consent decree, but the court declined to alter
election rules at such a late date.75 Ultimately, the Board’s consent decree
remained in place on appeal, despite dissenting opinions before the Fourth
Circuit en banc76 and the U.S. Supreme Court.77
Finally, partisans might disapprove of the rules their party advanced—or
that they themselves advanced—in subsequent challenges. Consider two
more disputes.
Before the pandemic, Michigan had a policy dispute about pre-processing
ballots early.78 Michigan allows voters to spoil absentee ballots up until the
day before an election.79 Processing ballots before Election Day prevents
voters from being able to spoil their ballots. Last year, Secretary of State
Jocelyn Benson proposed allowing clerks to begin processing ballots the
Friday before Election Day (i.e., four days before Election Day).80
Michigan’s former Secretary of State, Ruth Johnson, introduced a bill81
earlier in 2020—before the pandemic—to allow processing on the Monday
before (i.e., the day before) Election Day. During the pandemic, the bill was
amended to increase pre-processing time from eight hours to ten and to
expand its coverage to include cities with more than 25,000 residents. The
bill also shortened the time during which voters could spoil their ballots by
moving the spoliation deadline up from 4:00 PM on the day before Election
Day to 10:00 AM on the day before Election Day. This bill was passed by
the legislature and signed by the governor.82

74. See Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46, 46 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from
denial of application for injunctive relief).
75. Moore v. Circosta, 494 F. Supp. 3d 289, 331 (M.D.N.C. 2020).
76. Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 104 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); id. at
117 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
77. Moore, 141 S. Ct. at 46 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of application for
injunctive relief).
78. See Christine Ferretti, Benson, Detroit Clerk Press for Early Processing of Absentee
Ballots, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 28, 2020, 2:21 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/
news/local/detroit-city/2020/01/28/benson-detroit-clerk-press-early-absentee-ballotprocessing/4596454002/ [https://perma.cc/3KC5-4Z79] (quoting Secretary of State Benson’s
proposal for absentee ballots and a rejoinder by a member of the House that “an early tally of
absentee ballots carries challenges because Michigan voters are allowed to change their ballots
up to the day before the election”).
79. In the 2020 primary election, Michigan had more than 77,000 ballots spoiled for a
variety of reasons. Paul Egan, Michigan’s Election Has More Than 77,000 Spoiled Ballots:
Here’s What That Means, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 5, 2020, 12:13 PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/03/michigan-spoiled-ballotselection/6145212002/ [https://perma.cc/YE99-E8ZQ].
80. Beth LeBlanc, Benson Pushes for Early Counting of Absentee Ballots, Among Other
Changes, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 6, 2019, 11:17 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/
news/local/michigan/2019/03/06/benson-pushes-early-counting-absentee-ballots-otherchanges/3081439002/ [https://perma.cc/7U6W-73DQ].
81. S.B. 757, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2020).
82. 2020 Mich. Pub. Acts 177.
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After Election Day, ballot processing took demonstrably longer in
Michigan than it did in most other states.83 As it appeared that President
Trump was on pace to lose both the tight race in Michigan and the Electoral
College, the Trump campaign began to fixate on Michigan’s ballot-counting
practices in a torrent of litigation.84
Ask ex ante: What’s more important, voter choice to spoil ballots in the
relatively rare instances voters want to change their minds before Election
Day, or swift processing and counting of ballots to ensure public confidence
in prompt results? Before Election Day, Republicans in Michigan pressed
more for the former. The Michigan legislature made a small step in the
direction of the latter. But when it took Michigan (entirely predictably)
longer than most states to process and count the large number of absentee
ballots, Republican challengers alleged something nefarious and sought
assorted forms of legal relief, all of which were ultimately denied.85
In Iowa’s 2nd Congressional District election,86 the margin separating
Mariannette Miller-Meeks from Rita Hart was just forty-seven votes among
nearly 400,000 votes cast by the end of the canvass.87 Hart requested a
recount in all twenty-four counties in the district. Each county had its own
recount board, consisting of a Hart designee, a Miller-Meeks designee, and a
third mutually agreed-upon designee. State law permitted the boards to
determine whether to conduct a machine recount, a hand count, or both.88
Disparate county recount opportunities led to disparate strategies. The
Hart designees pressed for hand counts (or their equivalent) in
Democratic-leaning counties, presumably hoping to “pick up” more
undervotes and overvotes that the machines might have missed.89
83. See, e.g., Miles Parks, Why Vote Counting in Pennsylvania and Michigan Takes So
Long, NPR (Nov. 4, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/04/931136905/we-ll-beworking-24-hours-vote-counting-to-continue-through-the-week
[https://perma.cc/34ZHCNXV].
84. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Benson, No. 20-000225-MZ (Mich.
Ct. Cl. Nov. 6, 2020) (denying a motion for declaratory judgment seeking to halt the counting
of ballots due to allegations that an election observer had been denied access); Stoddard v.
City Election Comm’n of Detroit, No. 20-014604-CZ (Mich. 3d Jud. Cir. Nov. 6, 2020)
(denying a petition for an injunction to block the certification of election results until plaintiffs
could investigate and compare ballots with reported results); Constantino v. City of Detroit,
No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. 3d Jud. Cir. Nov. 13, 2020) (issuing order in response to
allegations of fraud at the TCF Center ballot-counting location).
85. See supra note 84.
86. I served as a designee to a county recount board on behalf of the Miller-Meeks
campaign.
87. See generally Todd E. Pettys, A View from the Recount Room, 105 IOWA LAW
REVIEW
ONLINE
37
(2021),
https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/
ILROnline_Volume105_Pettys.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL3A-VS75]; Kate Payne, Hart to
Request Recounts in All 24 Counties in Iowa’s 2nd Congressional District, IOWA PUB. RADIO
(Nov. 12, 2020, 10:43 AM), https://www.iowapublicradio.org/ipr-news/2020-11-12/hart-torequest-recounts-in-all-24-counties-in-iowas-2nd-congressional-district
[https://perma.cc/LD4J-MKVR].
88. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 721-26.105(2) (2021).
89. See Motion to Dismiss Notice of Contest Regarding the Election for Representative
in the 117th Congress from the Second Congressional District of Iowa, at 12–13, U. S. House
of Representatives (Jan. 21, 2021), https://cha.house.gov/sites/democrats.cha.house.gov/
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Meanwhile, Hart designees sought machine recounts in Republican-leaning
counties, presumably under the theory that machine recounts would keep the
count in those counties as close to Election Day totals as possible. By the
end of the recount, the margin had narrowed to just six votes in
Miller-Meeks’s favor.90 Hart filed an election contest in the House of
Representatives, requesting a new recount and alleging, among other things,
that voters had been treated inconsistently across counties—inconsistencies,
however, driven by her own delegates’ strategic decisions.91
All told, partisanship in state government could give rise to various types
of problems in litigation—skepticism of partisan legislative action or
inaction, consent decrees to circumvent legislative decisions, or adherence to
inconsistent positions when a partisan position fails. While the litigation is
responding to the partisanship, at times the litigation exacerbates partisanship
or acts to undermine a different branch of government’s preferences. And in
many of these cases, the litigation didn’t change a thing. 92
C. Additional Litigation Considerations
Two additional possibilities are worth mentioning, with empirical work to
be done. The first is the decline of preclearance after Shelby County v.
Holder.93 The Voting Rights Act required that some jurisdictions, mostly in
the South, submit proposed election laws for the review and approval of the
Department of Justice, which was charged with ensuring that the laws
“neither ha[d] the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color.”94 While most laws easily
files/documents/committee_docs/Miller-Meeks%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9AMF-HHW7].
90. See, e.g., Brianne Pfannenstiel, Pelosi to Provisionally Seat Iowa Republican
Miller-Meeks in Congress amid Election Challenge, DES MOINES REG. (Dec. 30, 2020,
4:59 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2020/12/30/miller-meeksseated-congress-provisionally-rita-hart-election-challenge/4073901001/
[https://perma.cc/2VD8-4Y87].
91. See, e.g., Notice of Contest Regarding the Election for Representative in the One
Hundred Seventeenth Congress from Iowa’s Second Congressional District, U.S. House of
Representatives (Dec. 22, 2020), https://cha.house.gov/sites/democrats.cha.house.gov/
files/documents/committee_docs/Notice%20Of%20Contest%20Hart%20v%20MillerMeeks.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKF2-2VS7]; Motion to Dismiss Notice of Contest, supra note
89, at 26–27 (describing how the Hart campaign created lack of uniformity); Contestant’s
Initial Brief in Response to Chairperson Lofgren’s Letter of March 10, 2021, at 29–31, U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Mar.
22,
2021),
https://cha.house.gov/sites/
democrats.cha.house.gov/files/documents/committee_docs/Hart%20v.%20MillerMeeks_March%2010%20Letter%20Initial%20Brief_COS_FINAL1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F6YQ-FKYL] (describing how the Hart designee to the board advocated for certain methods
in some counties and different methods in other counties). See generally Cases Properly Filed
Under the Federal Contested Election Act in the 117th Congress, COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN.,
https://cha.house.gov/Contested-Elections [https://perma.cc/MLQ5-9LYQ] (last visited Sept.
17, 2021).
92. A separate concern, of course, is whether courts are too hostile to certain types of
election law claims. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
93. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
94. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a).
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survived preclearance,95 it required state legislatures to be careful in enacting
new laws, and it provided leverage to out-of-power political groups to
bargain around the law and to negotiate settlements.96 The Court in Shelby
County found that the coverage formula that identified which jurisdictions
needed to submit their laws for preclearance was unconstitutional, as it had
not been materially updated since 1975.97 States that previously had been
subject to preclearance began enacting statutes in the same unencumbered
manner like other jurisdictions.98 Litigants seeking to assert voting rights
claims might rely on alternative avenues once preclearance disappeared.99
But preclearance only covered some states, and election litigation remains
outside of previously covered jurisdictions. Nevertheless, preclearance
assuredly slowed potential legislative changes, which also stymied
litigation—and its demise likely turned parties to judicial remedies.
Second, as the introduction of this Article notes, courts have increasingly
waded into ever-finer points of election administration.100 This is likely
attributable in part to the Supreme Court’s willingness to expand the test
refined in cases like Anderson v. Celebrezze101 and Burdick v. Takushi102—
which had previously been applicable principally in ballot access cases—to
all election laws, as demonstrated in Crawford v. Marion County.103 While
Crawford is famous for the Court’s decision upholding an Indiana voter
identification law, its more significant impact may be the unanimous Court’s
tacit approval of using the Anderson-Burdick balancing test for election laws
more generally.104 Indeed, the Wisconsin litigation before the Court turned
in part before the lower court on the appropriate application of the
Anderson-Burdick balancing test to absentee ballot deadlines.105

95. See Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?,
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 264 (2003).
96. See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend
the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 24 (2007); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and
Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 200–01 (2007); Recent Case,
Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1995), 109 HARV. L. REV. 681, 684 (1996); cf.
Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In
Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 732–33 (2006).
97. Derek T. Muller, Judicial Review of Congressional Power Before and After Shelby
County v. Holder, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 287, 312 (2013).
98. See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Texas Rushes Ahead with Voter ID Law After Supreme Court
Decision, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/25/texas-voter-id-supreme-court-decision [https://perma.cc/55GB-BRCL].
99. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439 (2015); Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon:
Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2010).
100. See generally Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L.J. 451 (2019);
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations
and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313 (2007).
101. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
102. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
103. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
104. Id. at 190 (plurality opinion); id. at 204–05 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 210–11 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 970 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
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II. THE DESIRABILITY AND POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING ELECTION
LITIGATION
Election litigation has unquestionably increased. Reducing that litigation
is desirable, but I acknowledge that this may be a contested claim. Some
might view certain types of litigation as desirable and other types less so.
Others might argue that living with litigation’s excesses is an acceptable cost
of maintaining powerful checks on state election administration. Looking to
nonjudicial solutions is hardly a novel proposition. Professor Rebecca
Green, for instance, has suggested that mediation offers opportunities to
resolve postelection disputes.106
One factor that counts against litigation might be voter confidence.
Measuring voter confidence is difficult and can take many forms.107 But as
Professor Hasen has explained, “When courts get involved in election
disputes, . . . they run a risk of undermining the public’s faith in the electoral
process and in the fairness of the courts.”108 Professor Hasen has
recommended that election law encourage litigation far in advance of an
election and discourage litigation after an election if the suit could have been
brought earlier.109 That is consistent with the Court’s oft-cited opinion in
Purcell v. Gonzalez.110
Another aspect of election litigation may undermine voter confidence even
more fundamentally. The body principally tasked with administering
elections is not the judiciary. There is ample Supreme Court precedent that
emphasizes deference to the state legislatures’ policy judgments in matters
of election administration, as opposed to the judiciary, particularly the federal
judiciary.111 This is not to understate the repeated invitations from the
106. See Rebecca Green, Mediation and Post-Election Litigation: A Way Forward, 27
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 325 (2012); see also Jessica Becerra, Note, The Possibility of
Using Alternative Dispute Resolution for Election Law Disputes, 18 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
117 (2018).
107. See, e.g., R. Michael Alvarez et al., Are Americans Confident Their Ballots Are
Counted?, 70 J. POL. 754 (2008); Lonna Rae Atkeson & Kyle L. Saunders, The Effect of
Election Administration on Voter Confidence: A Local Matter?, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 655
(2007); Shaun Bowler et al., Election Administration and Perceptions of Fair Elections, 38
ELECTORAL STUD. 1 (2015); Thad E. Hall et al., The Human Dimension of Elections: How
Poll Workers Shape Public Confidence in Elections, 62 POL. RES. Q. 507 (2009).
108. Hasen, supra note 11, at 37.
109. Id.
110. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
111. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019) (“The Framers were
aware of electoral districting problems and considered what to do about them. They settled
on a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures, expressly checked
and balanced by the Federal Congress . . . . At no point was there a suggestion that the federal
courts had a role to play.”); Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 392 (2012) (per curiam)
(“Redistricting is ‘primarily the duty and responsibility of the State.’ The failure of a State’s
newly enacted plan to gain preclearance prior to an upcoming election does not, by itself,
require a court to take up the state legislature’s task.” (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S.
1, 27 (1975)); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (“States have enacted
comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these schemes,
whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of
candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the
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Supreme Court for judicial intervention in elections.112 Judicial involvement
is sometimes warranted. Indeed, some critics have complained about too
little judicial intervention in preelection113 or postelection114 contests or
about the judiciary itself becoming a suspect source of reviewing election
litigation.115
But since Bush v. Gore,116 there has arisen an assumption—I might even
say a pernicious assumption—that the Supreme Court will be called upon to
decide the presidential election.117 Commentary surrounding the nomination
of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court in 2016 and then-judge Amy Coney

individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Nevertheless,
the state’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.”); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 85 (1966) (“Until this
point is reached [of failing to reapportion according to Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586
(1964)], a State’s freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an apportionment plan found
unconstitutional either as a whole or in part, should not be restricted beyond the clear
commands of the Equal Protection Clause.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964)
(“[L]egislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and
determination, and . . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to
reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had
an adequate opportunity to do so.”).
112. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (“We hold that this challenge to an
apportionment presents no nonjusticiable ‘political question.’”); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 29 (1968) (“We therefore hold that no State can pass a law regulating elections that violates
the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that ‘No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the
equal protection of the laws.’”); Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000)
(per curiam) (“As a general rule, this Court defers to a state court’s interpretation of a state
statute. But in the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable not only to elections
to state offices, but also to the selection of Presidential electors, the legislature is not acting
solely under the authority given it by the people of the State, but by virtue of a direct grant of
authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution.”).
113. See, e.g., Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Election Litigation in the Time of the Pandemic,
U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (June 26, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/06/
26/pandemic-stephanopoulos/ [https://perma.cc/7UPK-NCN9]; Joshua A. Douglas, Undue
Deference to States in the 2020 Election Litigation, 30 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
(forthcoming
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3720065
[https://perma.cc/D2YG-KEH6].
114. See Kevin Johnson, Why Judges, Not Lawmakers, Should Rule on Disputed Elections,
GOVERNING (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.governing.com/now/Why-Judges-Not-LawmakersShould-Rule-on-Disputed-Elections.html [https://perma.cc/674R-2VS5]; cf. EDWARD B.
FOLEY, BALLOT BATTLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(2016).
115. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Back to the Beginning: An Essay on the Court, the
Law of Democracy, and Trust, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045 (2008); James A. Gardner,
Forcing States to Be Free: The Emerging Constitutional Guarantee of Radical Democracy,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1467 (2003).
116. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
117. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court May No Longer Have the Legitimacy to Resolve
a Disputed Election, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2020/02/supreme-court-elections/605899/ [https://perma.cc/9C4S-MBMP].
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Barrett in 2020 made the prospect of the Court’s involvement a crucial
issue.118 But judicial neutrality in election disputes also has value.119
This Article’s proposal suggests ways to reduce the volume of litigation
without necessarily weighing in on the propriety of particular judicial
decisions—as substantively neutral a proposal as possible. Of course, less
litigation gives courts fewer opportunities to examine cases. But a call for
reducing litigation simply reflects a preference for legislative solutions. It
also seeks to reduce some effects of litigation, like incongruity of standards
across jurisdictions, which are the product of an absence of legislative
guidance. And it presses for a reduction in litigation funding, which will
force political parties to reduce their legal efforts on more marginal cases.
A. Leveling Up
One way to reduce litigation would be to implement federal statutes that
provide uniform rules. Congress has broad power over the manner of
congressional elections.120 Whether one describes this as a “Grand Election
Bargain,” a proposal that unites voter integrity efforts and voter access efforts
in coordination with one another as Professor Dan Tokaji has
recommended,121 or national scaling of projects like the American Law
Institute’s efforts to facilitate a convergence of state election law
doctrines,122 it would provide uniform ceilings and floors. The ripest targets
for litigation are states that have outlier practices or that make late-breaking
changes to election laws. Uniform federal rules eliminate any outliers and
preclude last-minute changes.
The path to federal statutory uniformity has precedent. Extensive litigation
in the wake of Bush v. Gore over punch card machines, among other
problems, was an impetus for Congress to enact the Help America Vote Act
of 2002.123 Litigation over the last few years, and particularly in 2020, may

118. See Mark Sherman, Nightmare: Election Dispute Goes to 8-Member Supreme Court,
AP NEWS (Nov. 4, 2016), https://apnews.com/article/a4ed2fc9d9e34d70b5f7f940a692a686
[https://perma.cc/W54U-NSG4]; Michael Kenny, U.S. Supreme Court Should Avoid Another
Bush
v.
Gore,
LAW.COM
(Oct.
8,
2020),
https://www.law.com/
dailyreportonline/2020/10/08/u-s-supreme-court-should-avoid-another-bush-v-gore/;
Sheldon Whitehouse, Opinion, A Justice Barrett Must Recuse Herself from Deciding the
Future of the President Who Picked Her, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2020, 2:38 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/11/justice-barrett-must-recuse-herselfdeciding-future-president-who-picked-her/ [https://perma.cc/5NND-JDC2].
119. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
1051, 1098–1103 (2010).
120. See generally Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over
Elections, 99 BOS. U. L. REV. 317 (2019).
121. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71 (2014).
122. See The Story of ALI, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/story-line/
[https://perma.cc/JFU7-Y3RT] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (describing projects by the ALI
that have served as popular secondary sources for courts throughout the country).
123. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); see Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform:
Discretion,
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provide a similar impetus. Congress has broad power to regulate federal
elections, and rules ranging from absentee ballot requirements to ballot
receipt deadlines could be fixed for federal elections.124 While recent
versions of H.R. 1, the For the People Act of 2021,125 assuredly have some
components that would fit this definition, as a sweeping omnibus it is hardly
the best vehicle for the kind of fit identified in this Article as most desirable.
Uniform federal rules undoubtedly restrict state decision-making. But
rules that provide both ceilings and floors ensure consistency of treatment
and reduce the likelihood of litigation. If states could enact certain laws but
chose not to do so, courts might be inclined to conclude that some of them
ought to do so. But if states were constrained by the federal standard, judicial
review would be a simpler matter of statutory interpretation.
It also increases the political salience of litigation. A litigant who asks a
federal judge to construe a federal statute in an arguably incongruous or
unconstitutional way would face appellate and potentially Supreme Court
review. An appellate court construing a federal statute would have multistate
influence, and the Supreme Court could develop uniform nationwide
precedent.126 In a way, it increases the power of litigation; but in another
way, it requires litigants to reckon with the likelihood of appellate review and
long-term precedent contrary to their interests.
Another way to reduce litigation would be for state legislatures to provide
uniform guidance to local election officials in election administration.
Litigation surrounding lack of uniform voter treatment has exploded since
Bush v. Gore.127 But much of that litigation stems from the intuitive notion
that like voters should be treated alike—and that means all voters in a
statewide election, or all voters within a district, should have similar
treatment.
To the extent discretionary decisions should be made, state administrators
should strive for increased uniformity. This would allow ex ante challenges
to their decisions (rather than reactionary ex post lawsuits responding to a
lack of uniformity), consistency of treatment of voters across counties, and
consistency of judicial remedies when issued. But state legislatures ought to
be developing holistic regimes for participation in elections. And legislatures
are capable of acting even during the coronavirus pandemic, as they
demonstrated in many jurisdictions.

Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1209–14
(2005).
124. Cf. Tolson, supra note 120, at 387–92 (describing the breadth of the scope of
authority).
125. H.R. 1, 117th Cong.
126. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the
Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 507, 528–29 (2008) (critiquing the lack of uniformity from Supreme Court
precedent in myriad election law cases).
127. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); see Michael T. Morley, Bush v. Gore’s Uniformity
Principle and the Equal Protection Right to Vote, 28 GEO. MASON L. REV. 229 (2020).
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Consider litigation in a Pennsylvania legislative district that arose after the
2020 election. A federal court considered a challenge to the unequal
treatment of ballots between counties—Allegheny County counted ballots
that lacked a voter’s written date beside their signature, but Westmoreland
County did not.128 The plaintiff sued Allegheny County to preclude its
officials from counting ballots. There was a dispute about whether the date
requirement was “mandatory,” meaning such votes could not be counted, or
“directory,” meaning they could.129
The court recognized that a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision suggested the ballots could be
counted, but there was disparate treatment between the counties.130 The
remedy, however, could not be to invalidate the ballots to create equal
treatment; the better solution would be to ask Westmoreland to count the
ballots it did not count. But Westmoreland was not a party, and that wasn’t
the relief sought, so the disparity remained.
The entire litigation, however, could have been prevented with a uniform
ex ante rule. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to resolve an
ambiguity in the statute about whether counting the ballots in Allegheny
County was mandatory or directory. But without a uniform legislative rule—
or other counties joined in the case and bound by its holding—the disparity
lingered past Election Day. Resolving disputes like this or others mentioned
above could be remedied with greater uniformity of state election rules,
which would reduce disparities and, accordingly, reduce litigation about
disparities.
B. Eliminating Litigation Earmark
Finally, Congress should abolish the Cromnibus election litigation
earmark.131 The economic incentives it creates are perverse. It is much
easier for wealthy donors to fund the party’s litigation than it is for them to
fund the candidate’s campaign. And it sets aside vast sums of money
exclusively for election litigation. Because recounts occur rarely, and still
more rarely alter the outcome of an election, the money is more likely to flow
to preelection litigation or other sorts of postelection contests. There are
many opportunities between both those lawsuits with a relatively high
likelihood of success and those frivolous cases subject to sanctions—more
money to spend means more litigation among those opportunities.
Previously, political campaigns had to allocate resources carefully across
domains, making decisions about advertising, get-out-the-vote efforts,
consultant services, travel, and legal expenses. Each competed for resources
within the campaign. That would serve as a natural check to ensure that only
the lawsuits most likely to succeed would be filed.

128. See Ziccarelli v. Allegheny Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 2:20-CV-01831, 2021 WL
101683 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2021).
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id. at *1.
131. See supra note 40.
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The major political parties are hardly starved for money in presidential
elections. The 2020 presidential election yielded record fundraising levels
for the candidates; a rocky economy didn’t stifle contributions and the
inability to plan traditional campaign events didn’t stifle expenditures.
It is not clear what the direct effect of the Cromnibus earmark had on
litigation, and it is not clear what the direct effect of removing it would have,
either. But the evidence presented in the Appendix suggests some
correlation. And cutting litigation funding certainly wouldn’t lead to more
litigation.
The reduction in funding would be agnostic as to any given litigation.
Instead, it would simply require campaigns to winnow out the challenges
least likely to succeed. An alternative might be that campaigns would shift
their resources only to the jurisdictions they anticipate would be the most
winnable and litigate even marginal claims there. But this would still require
campaigns to make more careful judgments about pursuing litigation,
including assessments about likelihood of success.
It is also entirely plausible to posit that the litigation could have
asymmetric consequences on the parties. Democrats in 2020, for instance,
spent more money than Republicans on legal fees.132 Conversely, it appears
there are more opportunities at America’s largest law firms to support
Democratic-initiated litigation133 and more hostility toward Republican-led
efforts,134 which may exert disproportionate consequences in litigation
strategy if funding becomes more limited and parties rely on outside groups
litigating by proxy. Furthermore, as described above,135 it is entirely possible
that strong outside third-party funding would strip the parties of control over
some of that litigation. And it might be the case that because these third-party
groups are overwhelmingly left-of-center, the proposal to remove the
Cromnibus earmark would tilt litigation in a decidedly partisan direction.
There are more aggressive options that could be included. One might be
inclined to sanction attorneys more aggressively or mete out punishments
against law firms. Some election law attorneys have faced just such penalties
in the aftermath of the 2020 election.136 But this Article seeks to address the
132. See Appendix.
133. Jane C. Timm, Top Private Law Firms Plan ‘SWAT Teams’ to Fight Voting
Restrictions in Court, NBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2021, 11:25 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/elections/top-private-law-firms-plan-swat-teams-fight-voting-laws-n1263891
[https://perma.cc/T3HD-5K5R].
134. Jones Day Statement Regarding Election Litigation, JONES DAY (Nov. 2020),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/news/2020/11/jones-day-statement-regarding-electionlitigation [https://perma.cc/FP44-QUDC]; Dan Packel, Polarizing Election Work,
Discrimination Suits May Dent Jones Days’ Appeal to Young Lawyers, LAW.COM
(Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2020/12/17/polarizing-election-workdiscrimination-suits-may-dent-jones-days-appeal-to-young-lawyers/
[https://perma.cc/WL2X-CV98].
135. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Hughes, No. 20-40643 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2021)
(sanctioning attorneys at Perkins Coie for filing a “redundant and misleading” motion in
election litigation); Wis. Voters All. v. Pence, No. 20-03791, 2021 WL 686359 (D.D.C. Feb.
19, 2021) (referring matter to Committee on Grievances for attorney’s election litigation
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next tranche of election law litigation—the stuff that is not frivolous or
brought in bad faith but the stuff that is the next-most marginal litigation.
It is a challenge to develop ways of reducing election-related litigation
without undermining a given set of substantive commitments to voting rights
and election integrity, which are part of a greater concern about public
confidence in the legitimacy of election systems and outcomes. But these
modest solutions could, I hope, make election laws less susceptible to
becoming litigation targets in a substantively neutral fashion.
APPENDIX137

filings as “political grandstanding”). See generally Brett Kendall & Alexa Corse, Trump 2020
Election Lawsuits Lead to Requests to Discipline Lawyers, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2021,
10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-2020-election-lawsuits-lead-to-requests-todiscipline-lawyers-11620568801 [https://perma.cc/D85R-AJ8V].
137. Data on receipts was pulled directly from the campaign finance data resource on the
Federal Election Commission’s website. Disbursement data covers six major party groups:
DCCC, DNC, DSCC, NRCC, NRSC, and RNC (values added under “Spender Name or ID”).
To capture any data relating to legal recount-related spending, results were narrowed by
filtering for lines relating to legal costs, i.e., the word “legal,” “lawyer,” or “attorney.” The
reporting period for the data covers 2003–2020. Contribution data would be superior to
identify new earmarked donations for legal expenses, but there are greater challenges in
aggregating that data, and it would not as easily allow pre-2014 comparisons. Special thanks
to Kevin Kim for assembling this data.
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Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

Democratic
$912,575
$4,220,411
$1,285,385
$1,547,883
$2,731,100
$1,691,182
$2,621,561
$2,606,548
$2,057,986
$2,482,184
$1,610,839
$2,769,338
$2,878,111
$7,218,312
$4,516,914
$11,073,203
$10,624,914
$39,215,995

Republican
$4,282,283
$1,239,832
$3,911,448
$2,648,857
$2,485,324
$1,299,528
$2,679,356
$1,762,231
$986,969
$5,187,997
$2,144,646
$2,984,671
$2,038,542
$8,119,833
$5,477,101
$13,155,833
$17,385,252
$27,748,225

[Vol. 90
Total
$5,194,858
$5,460,243
$5,196,834
$4,196,740
$5,216,425
$2,990,711
$5,300,917
$4,368,779
$3,044,956
$7,670,181
$3,755,485
$5,754,010
$4,916,653
$15,338,145
$9,994,015
$24,229,036
$28,010,166
$66,964,220

